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 Abstract 
Three experiments examined how the different cues to gaze direction contribute to children’s 
abilities to follow and make explicit judgments about gaze. In each study participants were 
shown blurred images of faces containing only luminance cues to gaze direction, line-drawn 
images containing only fine-grained detail supporting a geometric analysis of gaze direction, 
and unmanipulated images. In Experiment 1a, 2- and 3- year olds showed gaze-cued orienting 
of attention in response to unmanipulated and blurred faces, but not line-drawn faces. Adult 
participants showed cueing effects to line drawn faces as well as the other two types of face 
cue in Experiment 1b. In Experiment 2, 2-year-olds were poor at judging toward which of 
four objects blurred and line-drawn faces were gazing, whereas 3- and 4-year-olds performed 
above chance with these faces. All age groups performed above chance with unmanipulated 
images. These findings are consistent with an early-developing luminance-based mechanism, 
which supports gaze following, but which cannot initially support explicit judgments, and a 
later-developing mechanism, additionally using geometric cues in the eye, which supports 
explicit judgments about gaze. 
  
1. Introduction 
Knowing what someone is attending to is one of the most fundamental ‘theory of 
mind’ abilities.  Tracking attention is required to determine the content of more complex 
representational mental states such as knowledge or belief.  Consequently, understanding of 
visual attention has been argued to be a precursor to understanding belief.  As Gómez (1996) 
puts it, understanding eye direction is “an early and simple way to know what is in the other’s 
mind, because the contents of the other’s mind – the object looked at – is in front of the 
beholder’s eyes” (p.334).  Researchers on infant gaze following typically conceptualise 
infants’ understanding in terms of representational mental states.  For example, Butler, Caron, 
and Brooks (2000) suggest that following an adult’s gaze direction indicates that children 
understand “that there is a psychological and attentional relation between adult and target”.  
This view is consistent with recent findings of early sensitivity to others’ false beliefs from 
late infancy (Clements & Perner, 1994; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate, Senju, & 
Csibra, 2007).  The nature of children’s gaze understanding is fundamental to the debate 
about early theory of mind development. 
Gaze following1 ability may be present in rudimentary form early in infancy. Hood, 
Willen, and Driver (1998) found that 4-month-olds’ attention could be cued by an image of a 
face executing a gaze shift to one side, without a concomitant head turn.  This only occurred 
when the face vanished before target onset, suggesting limitations on infants’ ability to shift 
their attention.  Naturalistic following of shifts in eye-direction alone can be reliably 
demonstrated by the age of 18 months (Moore & Corkum, 1998).   
However, while they are able to follow gaze from infancy, children cannot make 
explicit judgments about the same stimuli until the age of about 3 years.  For example, 
Doherty and Anderson (1999) found that only a minority of 3-year-olds and not all 4-year-
olds were capable of judging which of four widely separated objects a schematic face was 
looking at, or which of two schematic faces was apparently looking at them.  This difficulty is 
not limited to schematic faces, but also occurs with photographs (Anderson & Doherty, 1997; 
Doherty, Anderson, & Howieson, 2009) and live interaction with a real person (Doherty & 
Anderson, 1999).  The problem was not simply one of failing to understand the task, as the 
same children who were unable to judge gaze direction were well above chance in judging at 
which of the four objects a person was pointing (Doherty & Anderson, 1999; Doherty et al., 
2009) or gazing, if the head also pointed in that direction (Doherty & Anderson, 1999). These 
findings seem to challenge the view, summarised above, that gaze following gauges a 
relatively sophisticated understanding of a psychological relationship between gazer and 
target. 
How is it that children who can follow gaze, and who can make explicit judgments 
about pointing or head-and-eye direction cannot make such judgments solely on the basis of 
eye direction? Here we investigate the possibility that this is because infants’ gaze following 
and older children’s gaze judgments involve different aspects of visual information about 
gaze direction: luminance cues and the geometrical properties of the eye.  
Ando (2002) has proposed that these two sources of information may each contribute 
to the perception of gaze direction. For example, the relative luminance of the iris and sclera 
can yield a measure which is proportional to the angle of rotation of the eye in the head (see 
also Langton, Watt, & Bruce, 2000), while a geometrical analysis involving, say, the spatial 
location of the iris within the eye region can also provide a measure of eye rotation. The 
luminance mechanism is likely to be fast but coarse, the geometrical mechanism slower but 
more precise, through operating at a higher spatial resolution.  
Our suggestion is that the gaze following ability of children up to 2 to 3 years of age is 
likely to be based predominantly on luminance information. Certainly this seems likely for 
gaze following in early infancy: four-month-olds’ visual acuity is poor – around 40 times 
worse than a normal adult (de Heering et al., 2008) – which limits their ability to resolve the 
edge between the iris and sclera necessary for geometrical analysis of gaze direction; 
however, they are able to perceive contrast at very low spatial frequencies (Banks & 
Salapatek, 1978), which should allow them to use the gross luminance configuration of the 
eye in order to compute gaze direction.  
Furthermore, we suggest that children’s gaze perception continues to be dominated by 
luminance information until around 3 years of age when they start to be able to make explicit 
judgments about the objects of other people’s gazes (Doherty et al., 2009). This ability is 
initially fragile, however: 3-year-olds cannot yet distinguish between gaze to targets separated 
by 10 or 15 degrees of visual angle (Doherty et al., 2009). Development then proceeds 
gradually, not reaching adult levels of sensitivity until around 10 years of age (e.g., Vida & 
Maurer, 2012). This pattern of development, from very limited ability to make fine 
discriminations at 3 years and protracted gradual development thereafter, suggests children 
are acquiring a new skill. We suggest that this skill involves the use of precise geometric cues 
in the eye to compute gaze direction on the basis of which a verbal report can be given. If 
children were simply making the output of their existing luminance-based ability available to 
verbal report, we would expect a more rapid development of judgment precision. 
In summary, the suggestion is that gaze-cued attention is initially based on gross 
luminance information about eye direction. On the other hand, explicit judgments, which 
children make from around 3 years of age, additionally rely on more precise information 
derived from assessing the spatial configuration of eye features.  
These suggestions lead to two key predictions. First, the gaze following abilities of 2- 
to 3-year-old children will be dominated by luminance cues in the eye. Gaze following should 
therefore be impossible if the relevant luminance information is removed. Second, at around 3 
years of age children will begin to use geometric cues in the eye in order to make explicit 
gaze judgments.  We report three studies that test these predictions. In Experiment 1a we 
tested gaze following in a sample of 2- and 3-year-old children, and adults in Experiment 1b. 
In Experiment 2 we examined explicit gaze judgment in samples of 2-, 3-, and 4-year-olds. In 
each study we presented three different types of face cue: normal greyscale photographs, 
which contain both gross luminance and geometrical cues; blurred versions of these faces 
which retain luminance cues to gaze direction but where the precise spatial locations of the 
relevant eye features are difficult to resolve; and line-drawn versions where the spatial 
locations of eye features are available (geometric cues), but gross luminance cues to gaze 
direction are removed. 
2. Experiment 1a 
In Experiments 1a and 1b we used a gaze-cued orienting procedure. Toddlers were 
asked to identify which of two children’s TV characters appeared briefly on a computer. Prior 
to the character’s appearance, a face appeared on the screen either gazing towards the location 
where the character was to appear (a cued trial) or gazing in the opposite direction (an uncued 
trial). Gaze following was operationalized as increased accuracy identifying the character in 
cued versus uncued locations. The key manipulation concerned the availability of the two 
cues to gaze direction: face images contained only luminance cues (blurred faces), only 
geometric cues (line-drawn faces) or both cues (normal faces). We hypothesise that 2- to 3-
year-olds only have the luminance mechanism available for analysing gaze direction. They 
should therefore show a normal gaze following response to images containing luminance cues 
(the normal and blurred faces) but not to faces that only contain geometrical cues (line drawn 
images). Adults have been found to show a gaze-cued orienting response with luminance-free 
images (Langton, 2011); however, reaction time was the dependent variable, and the images 
used were created using an edge detection algorithm applied to a greyscale image of a face. 
The images produced in this way, and through methods such as high-pass filtering are not 
particularly child friendly, so a different method was adopted to produce the corresponding 
images for Experiments 1a and 1b. Experiment 1b was conducted in order to establish 
whether these images are also capable of triggering a typical gaze following response in adult 
participants.  
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants. 
Participants were 45 children: 21 2-year-olds (10 girls, mean age = 2 years 8 months 
(2;8), SD = 3.4 months, range = 2;0 to 2;11) and 24 3-year-olds (11 girls, mean age = 3;6, SD 
= 3.9 months, range = 3;0 to 3;11). 
2.1.2. Materials and apparatus 
Cue images portrayed a Caucasian female with dark hair and dark eyes and were 
obtained under good quality fluorescent lighting. Three images were obtained, all with the 
head facing forward: one with the eyes directed towards the right, one with the eyes directed 
towards the left and one with the eyes directed straight ahead. The latter was used as a 
template onto which the left and right eye regions from the respective images were pasted 
using Adobe Photoshop Elements 5.0. The resulting leftwards and rightwards gazing images 
were therefore identical, save for the gaze direction. The images were then cropped to show 
the head and hair on a white background, scaled to 539 x 489 pixels and converted to 
greyscale.  Blurred cue images were created by applying a Gaussian filter with a radius of 10 
pixels to the original images. Line-drawn images were created in Adobe Photoshop by using 
the paintbrush tool to trace the outline of the model’s head and facial features (see Fig. 1). 
The cue images subtended a horizontal viewing angle of approximately 9º at a distance of 70 
cm.  Target images of the TV animation characters Fireman Sam and Bob the Builder were 
cropped to show only the head including helmets and scaled to 113 x 123 pixels.  They were 
shown in colour and were positioned approximately 9º to the left or right of the centre of the 
screen (see Fig. 2). Stimuli were presented using E-Prime 2.0 software on a desktop PC with a 
17-inch LCD monitor at 1280 x 1024 resolution. Responses were recorded via a standard 
keyboard. 
Fig. 1. Examples of the face stimuli used in the experiments. Left, a normal face image; 
centre, a blurred image; and right, a line drawn image. 
2.1.3. Design 
Cue type (normal vs. blurred vs. line-drawn image) and target (cued vs. uncued) were 
within-subjects variables and age group (2-year-olds vs. 3-year-olds) a between-subjects 
variable. The dependent variable was the percentage of trials in which the child correctly 
identified the target stimulus. 
2.1.4. Procedure 
Participants played with the experimenter prior to formal testing in a room adjoining 
the main nursery. The procedure commenced with a series of practice trials; on the first screen 
images of Bob the Builder and Fireman Sam were shown and the children were asked to 
name them; if they did not know either the experiment was halted.  Children were instructed 
to look out for Bob and Sam and call out the name when one appeared.  The first practice trial 
showed a single image of Fireman Sam’s head. If the child did not respond they were asked 
who was in the picture. The second practice trial showed Bob the Builder. The experimental 
trials commenced if the child could recognise and identify both target images. Children were 
encouraged to watch carefully because Bob and Sam would be very fast.   
Each experimental trial began with a fixation cross in the centre of the screen for 500 
ms.  The cue face was then shown in the centre of the screen. After 500 ms the target item 
was shown to the left or the right of the cue face for 50 ms. The cue face remained on screen 
until the child responded (see Fig. 2).  Experimental trials were blocked by cue type, 8 for 
each type of image. The 8 trials within each block arose from combining each target identity 
(Bob and Sam) with both levels of target (cued and uncued) and each gaze direction (left and 
right). Trials were randomised within each block. The order of blocks was counterbalanced 
across participants. 
2.2. Results 
 The proportions of correctly identified targets in cued and uncued trials for each face 
type were computed (see Fig. 3.). Target identification accuracy was greater for cued targets 
Fig. 2.  An example of the sequence of events in a trial of Experiment 1. 
than for uncued targets for normal and blurred face trials. However, this cueing effect was not 
apparent with line drawn face cues; there was little difference in 3-year-olds’ identification of 
uncued and cued targets and two-year-olds’ accuracy was actually greater for uncued trials. 
A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with cue type 
(normal, blur, line) and target (cued, uncued) as within-subjects factors and age (2-year-olds, 
3-year-olds) as a between-subjects factor. This analysis yielded significant main effects of 
age, F(1, 43) = 4.08, p < .05, ηp2 = .09, and target, F(1, 43) = 7.41, p < .01, ηp2 = .15, and a 
significant interaction between cue type and target, F(2, 86) = 5.46, p < .01, ηp2 = .11. No 
other effects or interactions reached significance (ps > .54). The interaction between cue type 
and target was followed up using simple main effects analyses. These confirmed that for 
normal face images, targets were identified on a higher proportion of cued trials (M = .75) 
than uncued trials (M = .64), F(1, 129) = 6.27, p < .05. Similarly, for blurred images, accuracy 
was higher for cued targets (M = .75) than for uncued targets (M = .59), F(1, 129) = 11.67, p 
< .001. However, for line-drawn cues, the difference in accuracy between cued targets (M = 
.66) and uncued targets (M = .70) was not significant (p = .39). 
2.3. Discussion 
As predicted, 2- and 3-year-old children showed gaze cueing from combined 
luminance and geometric cues to gaze direction (normal faces) and luminance cues only 
(blurred faces), but not from faces where luminance information was removed (line-drawn 
faces). These data support the hypothesis that preschool children’s gaze following is based on 
a luminance mechanism for processing gaze direction. These children have either not yet 
learned to use geometric gaze cues to determine gaze direction, or this ability has not yet been 
coupled with the system that orients attention to gaze.  
One problem with this conclusion is that it is not known whether these cues can ever 
be used to trigger the kind of automatic gaze following response studied in Experiment 1a. 
This issue was addressed in Experiment 1b, which employed a modified version of the 
procedure used in Experiment 1a with a sample of adult volunteers. 
3. Experiment 1b 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants 
These were 24 undergraduate students (15 female) from the University of Stirling with 
a mean age of 26. 
3.1.2. Materials, Design and Procedure 
These were identical to those used in Experiment 1a, with the following exceptions. 
To ensure that adults did not perform at ceiling in the task, the presentation time of the targets 
was reduced to 32 ms and they were immediately followed by a pattern mask, which 
remained on the screen until participants responded with a keypress. Pilot testing indicated 
that this exposure duration yielded correct identification on around 75% of trials. Participants 
performed 12 practice trials with a 200 ms exposure duration of the target stimuli and a 
representative set of all possible trial types. The experimental trials were divided into three 
blocks according to cue type, with block order counterbalanced across participants. Each 
block contained 32 trials, with 4 repetitions of each combination of target location (cued vs. 
uncued), target identity (Sam vs. Bob), and gaze direction (left vs. right). A set of 8 practice 
trials, this time with the 32 ms target exposure duration, preceded each block.  
3.2. Results 
The proportions of correctly identified targets in each condition were first computed. 
Data were removed from 5 participants who scored below 50% correct in one or more of the 
experimental conditions. Data from the remaining 19 participants are summarised in Figure 3.  
Participants correctly identified a higher proportion of targets at cued (M = .82) versus 
uncued locations (M = .78). A repeated measures ANOVA with cue type and target as factors 
supported this observation. This analysis yielded only a significant main effect of target, F(1, 
18) = 5.2, p < 0.05, ηp2 = .22. Neither the main effect of face type nor the interaction between 
face type and target reached significance (ps > .7)2.  
 
 
3.3. Discussion 
Adults are clearly able to make explicit judgments about gaze direction based solely 
on the geometrical cues in the eye; however, the results of Experiment 1b suggest that this 
information can also be used to trigger an automatic gaze following response. In this study, 
Fig. 3. Proportion of correctly identified targets in each condition of 
Experiment 1b. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
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gaze direction triggered orienting effects in adults, regardless of whether the gaze cue was 
rendered as a normal photographic image, a line drawn image, or a blurred image. The failure 
to observe gaze following on the basis of geometric cues in 2- and 3-year-olds in Experiment 
1a is not simply a consequence of the inability of these cues to generate an effect.  
The results of Experiments 1a support our hypothesis that preschool children’s gaze 
following relies on luminance cues to gaze direction.  Our second hypothesis concerned 
explicit judgments about gaze direction. The suggestion was that children make use of 
geometrical information about gaze direction when making explicit judgments, which they do 
not do until around 3 years of age. Experiment 2 was designed to test this prediction. 
4. Experiment 2 
Children aged between 2 years 1 month and 4 years 11 months were asked which of 
four objects normal faces, blurred faces and line-drawn faces were looking at. Based on our 
hypothesis and previous findings (e.g., Anderson & Doherty, 1997; Doherty & Anderson, 
1999; Doherty et al., 2009) we predicted that 2-year-olds would perform poorly with all kinds 
of images, but that 3-year-old children would succeed with all stimuli, including line-drawn 
images. 
4.1. Method 
4.1.1. Participants 
Seventy-six children participated, in three age groups: 25 2-year-olds (17 girls, mean 
age = 2;7, SD = 3.5 months, range = 2;1 to 2;11), 24 3-year-olds (9 girls, mean age = 3;6, SD 
= 3.9 months, range = 3;0 to 3;11), and 27 4-year-olds (12 girls, mean age = 4;5, SD = 4.9 
months, range = 4;0 to 4;11). 
4.1.2. Materials and apparatus 
Four greyscale images were obtained at the same time, under the same conditions of 
the same female as in Experiment 1.  Each showed the eyes looking to one corner of the 
screen.  Normal, blurred and line-drawn versions of each image were created as in 
Experiment 1 and rescaled to the same size (Fig. 4). Practice trials used three greyscale 
images of another female’s face, looking left, right and straight ahead. These images 
measured 286 x 363 pixels and subtended a viewing angle of approximately 6º at a viewing 
distance of 70 cm.  
Target images showing a mug, a balloon, a car, and a teddy bear were scaled to 227 x 
239 and subtended a viewing angle of approximately 3º. A different version of each target 
image was created in red, yellow, orange, purple, green and blue, adjusted using Adobe 
 
  
Fig.4. Examples of the displays used in the explicit gaze judgment task of Experiment 2. A 
normal face with a bottom-left gaze (a), a blurred face with a top-left gaze (b), and a line-
drawn face with a top-right gaze (c). 
(a) (b) 
(c) 
Photoshop to ensure approximately equivalent hue. To control for potential colour and item 
preferences, 24 variations of item position and the colour were created, and sampled pseudo-
randomly; each object differed in colour, and the same pattern of colour and target items 
never occurred twice for a given participant. 
The experiment was presented using E-Prime 2.0 on a Toshiba Tecra laptop with a 17 
inch screen at 1280 x 720 resolution; responses were recorded by the experimenter via the 
keyboard.   
4.1.3. Design 
The materials were tested in a 3 x 3 factorial design with a between-subjects factor of 
age group (2- vs. 3- vs. 4-year-olds) and a within-subjects factor of cue image (normal vs. 
blurred vs. line-drawn).  The dependent variable was the proportion of correct identifications 
of the target item.   
4.1.4. Procedure 
Participants were invited to play a game with the experimenter individually in a room 
adjoining the main nursery.  Practice trials began with an image of a Caucasian female 
looking left. Children were asked where the lady was looking. If they did not respond the 
experimenter pointed to the left side of the screen and asked “is she looking over here?” This 
sequence was repeated for the rightward and forward gazing faces. The final practice trial 
showed the four target images without a central face. The experimenter asked the child to 
point to each item in turn. 
Each experimental trial showed a cue image in the centre of the screen looking at one 
of the target items, positioned in the corners of the screen (see Fig. 4). The experimenter 
asked the child to point to what the lady was looking at.  If the child did not appear to 
understand, on the first trial they would also be asked what the lady’s eyes were looking at.  
Each child completed 8 trials with each of the 3 types of face image (normal, blurred 
and line-drawn), with each gaze direction seen twice for each type of face. Trials were 
blocked by image type; order of block presentation was counterbalanced across children. 
Trials were selected randomly within each block. 
4.2. Results 
Figure 5 shows the proportion of correct explicit judgments for each age group for 
each face type. The same pattern is evident across all ages: performance was superior with 
normal images compared with blurred and line drawn images.  
  Proportions of correct responses were entered into an ANOVA with age group as a 
between-subjects factor and face type as a within-subjects factor. This analysis yielded main 
effects of age, F(1, 73) = 47.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .57, and of face type, F(2, 146) = 22.72, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .24. The interaction between face type and age was not significant (p = .15). 
Fisher’s LSD tests confirmed that performance was superior for normal faces (M = .75) than 
Fig. 5. Proportion of correct responses in each condition of the explicit judgment task in 
Experiment 2. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
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for line-drawn images (M = .57), t(146) = 6.23, p < .001, and blurred images (M = .59), t(146) 
= 5.39, p < .001, for which performance was equivalent (p = .40). Separate one-sample t-tests 
comparing proportion correct scores to chance (.25) for each face type indicated that the 2-
year-olds performed at chance for line-drawn images (M = .30), t(24) = 1.83, p = .08, 
exceeded chance for blurred images (M = .33), t(24) = 2.29, p = .03, and were comfortably 
above chance for normal images (M = .57), t(24) = 6.61, p < .01. 
Incorrect responses were coded as either to the same or opposite side as gaze direction 
for each of type of face. For blurred faces, 37% of 2-year-olds’ errors were to the gazed-at 
side of the screen. This figure was 35% for line-drawn faces. Neither figure differed 
significantly from the one-third errors expected by chance (binomial test, ps > .16, 1-tailed). 
Two-year-olds’ errors to the gazed at side for normal faces, however, were significantly more 
frequent than expected by chance (50% of errors, binomial test, p < .001, 1-tailed). Three- and 
4-year-olds’ errors for all face types were also significantly more likely to the gazed-at side 
than would be expected by chance (binomial tests, all p’s < .001, 1-tailed).     
4.3. Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 support the hypothesis that success in making explicit 
judgments about gaze direction emerges at around 3 years of age, and involves the use of 
geometrical cues. As predicted, 2-year-olds performed poorly, and were at or only slightly 
above chance for the geometric and luminance stimuli. Furthermore, their errors on trials 
involving these faces were apparently random. However, on trials with normal faces, children 
tended to err by picking the incorrect object on the gazed-at side of the display. This suggests 
that the youngest children were able to extract some directional information from the normal 
images. 
The 3-year-olds performed better.  Their relatively good performance with line-drawn 
faces indicates that, as predicted, 3-year-olds are beginning to use geometrical cues in their 
gaze judgments.  Three- and 4-year-olds’ errors were more systematic, tending to be to the 
correct side. Performance with normal images was above chance for each age group, and 
superior to performance for images with either geometrical or luminance cues removed. 
In summary, these data suggest that children from 2-years onwards rely on both 
sources of information to make explicit gaze judgments; when either luminance cues, or 
geometrical cues were unavailable, performance deteriorated, and each source of information 
on its own proved roughly equally useful.  
5. General Discussion 
The findings of the experiments reported here suggest that gaze following and 
explicit judgment about gaze rely on different sources of information during development. In 
Experiment 1a, normal greyscale photographs of faces produced gaze-cued orienting effects 
in 2- to 3-year-olds. This effect survived the removal of precise, geometric cues to gaze 
direction, but not the removal of luminance cues. The gaze following of 2- to 3-year-olds 
therefore seems to be based on the gross luminance information in the eye. Adults, on the 
other hand, were cued by each type of image (Experiment 1b). 
Three-year-olds but not 2-year-olds could make explicit gaze judgments based on the 
luminance-free line-drawn images (Experiment 2), suggesting the ability to use geometric 
cues in explicit judgments of gaze direction arises around this age. It is also clear that the 
explicit judgments of 3- and 4-year olds use both luminance cues and geometric information. 
Together, these data suggest that children’s gaze following and explicit judgment use 
different cues: gaze following is dominated by luminance cues, whereas gaze judgment uses 
both geometric and luminance information.  
What do these findings suggest about the underlying psychological mechanisms that 
support gaze following and gaze judgment? Doherty et al. (2009; Doherty, 2006) 
hypothesised that there are developmentally distinct gaze processing systems, making a 
distinction similar to suggestions for two systems for reasoning about belief (Apperly & 
Butterfill, 2009) and two system cognitive theories in general (e.g., Kahneman, 2011): an 
innate, fast, automatic, but approximate system that initially supports gaze following (System 
1); and a learned, relatively slow, computationally demanding, and precise system that 
supports gaze judgment (System 2). The present findings were predicted from this theory. The 
fast System 1 mechanism might compute gaze direction through an analysis of luminance 
cues and provide output to attention orienting systems. This mechanism would serve to orient 
infants’ attention in the direction of others’ gaze.  At around three years of age, children begin 
to use the slower System 2 mechanism. This system uses spatial locations of relevant eye 
features to compute a more precise line of regard, and its output is available to explicit 
judgment. The data here suggest that the putative System 2 combines luminance and 
geometrical information. 
5.1. One system or two? 
However, do the data require postulation of two systems rather than a single system 
that over time incorporates a wider range of cues? A single system claim could proceed thus: 
the gaze following system functions from infancy, initially computing gaze direction using 
luminance cues in the eye. Later in development (e.g., at around 3 years of age) this system 
begins to incorporate geometrical cues.  At around this age children also become reflectively 
aware that they are changing their own focus of attention as a result of gaze cues of others.  
This allows them also to use their gaze system to make judgements about others’ attention, as 
in the gaze judgment task of Experiment 23. This reflective awareness could plausibly be part 
of general theory of mind developments around the age of 3 years.  The same theory of mind 
developments could also influence the incorporation of geometrical gaze cues as children 
begin to pay more attention to the attentional focus of others. 
This account also provides a coherent developmental story.  A difficulty is that it 
makes clear predictions about the timing of developments that are inconsistent with the 
present data.  If a single system begins to incorporate geometrical cues into gaze processing, 
geometrical cues should then be available for both cuing and judgement, or available for 
cuing first (if judgement requires additional factors such as late-developing reflective 
understanding).  Present findings, however, suggest that geometrical cues are available for 
judgement before they are available for cuing. Three-year-old children failed to follow gaze 
on the basis of line drawn images (Experiment 1a), while children of the same age were able 
to make explicit judgments on the basis of these images (Experiment 2).   
On the other hand, adult performance suggests that at some point geometrical cues are 
incorporated into gaze following.  When and how this happens requires further research.  For 
example, proponents of a single system view could argue that gaze following is so well-
practiced that children perseverate using only luminance cues after geometric cues become 
available.  A novel skill like gaze judgement, however, would use all the cues available at the 
age at which it develops. 
6. Conclusion 
To sum up present findings, preschool children rely on luminance cues when 
following eye direction, but make use of both luminance and geometrical gaze cues when 
making judgements of eye direction. We suggest that it is the nascent understanding of other 
people as agents with mental states that drives development of the use of more precise 
geometric information about gaze direction. By their third birthday, children begin to 
understand that things can appear in other people’s minds, and that the moment-to-moment 
content of others’ mental states can often be determined by where they are looking; in other 
words, attention begins to be understood as a representational mental state. This realisation 
prompts the need for more precise determination of gaze direction (see Doherty, 2011, for a 
discussion).  This characterisation reverses what is more commonly assumed to be the 
developmental course of events. Rather than the mentalistic understanding of gaze serving as 
a precursor to the understanding of belief (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995, Gómez, 1996), we 
suggest that a representational understanding of mental states prompts a protracted period of 
learning to discriminate eye direction.  
 
 
Footnotes 
1  In this paper we use the term “gaze following” to denote either an overt shift of attention in 
the gazed-at direction or a covert shift of attention which does not involve a movement of the 
eyes. Covert deployment of attention is usually inferred by some performance benefit in 
responding to targets toward which another’s gaze has recently been directed, relative to 
targets that have not been cued in this way.  
2 According to the recommendation of Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn (2011) we also 
conducted an equivalent ANOVA including data from those participants that were removed in 
the original analysis. This also yielded a significant main effect of target, F(1, 23) = 5.28, p < 
0.05, ηp2 = .19, no significant effect of cue type (p = .65) and no interaction between these 
factors (p = .32). Our findings are therefore not reliant on the exclusion of data. 
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
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